decentralization of services from central governments to subnational governments, and by extension to third parties-nonprofit agencies and private firms-who increasingly manage in the name of the state" (p. 193) . Stated simply, the hollow state refers to the extent to which governments are directly involved in providing services. Although scholars have used other terms to describe the same phenomenon, the metaphor of the hollow state is now widely recognized as the term of choice among those who talk and write about the changing nature of the public sector.
1 When Milward and his coauthors (1993) directed our attention to the hollow state, the phenomenon was in its infant stages of development, but it was rapidly maturing as administrative technologies such as contracting out, deregulation, and other forms of privatization gained widespread popular and political support. As the march toward an increasingly hollow state proceeded with deliberate speed, writers across a spectrum of disciplines sought to understand its nature, characteristics, and administrative requirements as well as its implications for democratic governance (Milward, 1996; Milward & Provan, 2000; Peters, 1994) . These scholarly efforts have provided important insights into the hollow state phenomenon.
We now know a great deal about the hollow state. We know that public managers need different competencies and skill sets to effectively function in the hollow state (Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Kettl, 1993; Milward, 1994; Praeger & Desai, 1996; Savas, 2000; Van Slyke, 2003; Wallin, 1997) . We know that an increasingly hollow state raises important questions about democratic accountability and, in turn, the legitimacy of the administrative state (Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Box, Marshall, Reed, & Reed, 2001; Milward & Provan, 2000; Peters, 1994; Terry, 1998a) . Finally, we know that administrative technologies primarily used to create the hollow state are integral components of a global revolution in public management broadly described as the New Public Management (NPM; Aucoin, 1995; Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996; Hood, 1991 Hood, , 1995a Hood, , 1995b Kettl, 1997) . This revolutionary approach to public management and its effect on administrative institutions forced to function in an increasingly hollow state is the focus of our attention.
In this article, I argue that NPM philosophy and practices have contributed to an increasingly hollow state with thinning administrative institutions. I make the case that thin administrative institutions are fragile (Comfort, 2002) . Fragile institutions lack the integrity and, in turn, the capacity to effectively serve the public good. In pursuing this line of argument, I assert that fragile administrative institutions are weak; weak institutions lack the capacity for good administration. This is a matter of great concern, for as Alexander Hamilton (1787) wisely informs us in Federalist 27, the American public's confidence in government is "proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration" (p. 172). The thinning of administrative institutions merely exacerbates the erosion of public confidence in government (Nye, Zellikow, & King, 1997; Orren, 1997; Ruscio, 1996 Ruscio, , 1997 . The current state of affairs deserves serious consideration; it raises troubling questions about the long-term stability of the U.S. constitutional democracy.
I begin by briefly discussing the NPM. This discussion is guided by the premise that the NPM movement is, in many respects, a response to the crisis of the Western state created by market libertarians (Cohn, 1997) . Special attention is devoted to the two dominant approaches of the NPM movement, liberation management and market-driven management. Next, I discuss the concept of thin institutions. Drawing on the institutional theories of Philip Selznick (1957 Selznick ( , 1992 and Richard Scott (1995) , I offer a theoretical framework for examining and assessing the capacity of administrative institutions. I use this framework and concrete examples to illustrate how NPM reforms are contributing to the thinning of administrative institutions. Finally, I conclude by speculating on what this may mean for the U.S. constitutional democracy.
CRISIS, REFORM, AND THE NPM
The Dutch scholars Arjen Boin and Paul 't Hart (2003) make a convincing argument about the relationship between crisis and reform. In a probing analysis of public leadership in times of crisis, Boin and 't Hart argue that crises provide golden opportunities for reforming institutional structures and long-standing policies (p. 545). Although Boin and 't Hart challenge aspects of the so-called crisis-reform thesis, they acknowledge that political leaders use and in some instances create crises to generate momentum for governmental reform efforts. Boin and 't Hart (2003) assert that "reform leadership is an exercise in creative destruction" as "old structures must be destroyed before new ones can be implemented" (p. 549). They advise reform-minded public leaders to "exploit the crisis damage" and to "build support for nonincremental reform" by portraying "crises as the result of flaws in the existing institutional order" (p. 549). Leaders are told to make frequent, strong public pronouncements about their commitment to drastic changes. Boin and 't Hart's (2003) crisis-reform thesis and related reform imperatives are illuminating, especially when they are viewed in light of the global governmental reform initiatives of the last 20 years or so. Beginning with Ronald Reagan in the United States and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, political leaders of the market libertarian persuasion (James, 1992) sought to create a sense of crisis to achieve a wide-ranging restructuring of the public sector. To achieve this end, they used multiple strategies, including "rhetoric and policy decisions to undermine the capabilities of the state, turning the macrocrisis of Western society into a crisis of the western state [italics added]" (Cohn, 1997, p. 596 ; see also Aucoin, 1995) . By vilifying the administrative state in general and public servants in particular, market libertarians attempted to create a climate of discontent (Terry, 1997) . The desired result was a crisis that demanded radical changes in the fundamental nature of the state. Daniel Cohn (1997) astutely observes that "neoconservative governments, lead by committed market libertarians" were determined to change the "purposes and operating values of the state" (p. 586). According to Cohn, market libertarians were unified in their goal of protecting the market from society's demand. This was a radical departure from the goal of protecting society from the market's demands, a dominant characteristic of the Keynesian welfare state (p. 586).
Market libertarians, with the support of the more pragmatic market liberals, were successful in turning the macrocrisis of Western society into a crisis of the Western state (Cohn, 1997; James, 1992; Jessop, 1993 Jessop, , 1995 . In English-speaking democracies especially, political leaders exploited the crisis by blaming the state for slow economic growth, inflationary wage pressures, and a multitude of other economic and social ills. Consistent with the arguments advanced by Boin and 't Hart (2003) , market libertarians communicated a sharply honed message: The only way to turn the situation around was to drastically reform the public sector by implementing management technologies compatible with the new so-called Schumpeterian workfare state (Cohn, 1997; Jessop, 1993) . This required dismantling and abandoning traditional administrative management practices of the Keynesian welfare state (Barzelay, 1992; Osborne & Plastrik, 1997; Roberts & Bradley, 2002) and replacing them with management technologies conveniently organized under the label of the NPM.
THE NPM AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF GOVERNANCE
Governments worldwide responded to the market libertarians' message and adopted NPM philosophy and practices. Countries as diverse as New Zealand, Zambia, Japan, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Chile, France, Singapore, and Australia aggressively pursued sweeping governmental reforms (Haque, 2001; Hood, 1995a Hood, , 1995b Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995) . With an evangelical zeal, NPM believers sought to covert others by enthusiastically proclaiming that the "New Public Management was here to stay" (Borins, 1995, p. 122) . But what exactly does this mean? Moreover, what is the NPM? Answers to these questions have been subject to intense debate.
At least as far back as 1991 when Christopher Hood published his seminal article "A Public Management for All Seasons?" NPM has been debated at professional conferences and in the scholarly literature (Jones, 2002; Jones, Schedler, & Wade, 1997; Kettl, 1997; Terry, 1998b; Thompson, 1997) . Scholars have debated the origins and theoretical foundation of NPM (Gruening, 2001) , questioned whether NPM represents a separate and distinct field of public-management inquiry (Barzelay, 1999; Lynn, 1998; Mathiasen, 1999) , and pondered whether NPM is a passing fad (Jones, 2002; Lynn, 1998) . Although this debate is far from over, there is at least general agreement on the theoretical foundation of NPM. Scholars agree that managerialism (Enteman, 1993; Pollitt, 1990) , publicchoice theory (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962) , transaction-cost economics (Williamson, 1995) , and principal-agent theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1975; T. Moe, 1984; Wood, 1989) are important influences. The complex mixture of these theoretical perspectives has produced what I describe elsewhere as the neo-managerialist ideology or neo-managerialism (Terry, 1998a) . dysfunctional bureaucratic system has incarcerated public managers, limiting their freedom to improve government performance (Gore, 1993) . To achieve better results, public managers must be freed (liberated, many say) from what is condemned as senseless red tape. As Peter Aucoin (1995) notes, advocates of liberation management argue that politicians and others must let managers manage (Boston et al., 1996; Kettl, 1997 ; see also Aucoin, 1995) . How are public managers to secure their freedom from an evil, oppressive bureaucratic system? Supporters of liberation management offer a variety of interrelated strategies ranging from deregulating the internal management of public agencies to decentralizing and streamlining various management processes such as procurement, human resources, and budgeting (Kelman, 1987; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) .
The second concept, market-driven management, provides a lightning rod for scholarly discussion of NPM (Box et al., 2001; deLeon & Denhardt, 2000; Gawthrop, 1999; Stivers, 2000) . Two basic premises guide market-driven management. One is the presumed advantage of competition; the other is the perceived superiority of private-sector technologies and practices. With regard to competition, supporters of market-driven management rely on neoclassical economics and its admiration for the belief in the efficiency of the markets (Peters, 1996) . From this perspective, competition refers to the "creation of internal markets in an attempt to reform the public sector from the inside" (Loffler, 1997, p. 7 ; see also Considine, 2001, p. 28; Peters, 1996, p. 28) . Proponents of market-driven management make the compelling argument that exposing public managers to market forces motivates them to improve their performance (Boston et al., 1996; Kettl, 1997) . In the world of market-driven management, competition is a proven strategy to make managers manage (Aucoin, 1995; Kettl, 1997) .
The perceived superiority of private-sector practices and technologies has a long tradition. Champions of market-driven management argue that any effort to distinguish between public and private management is misguided and urge public-sector managers to learn from their private-sector brethren. This certainly makes sense if one presumes that management is management (Peters, 1996, p. 28) and that the record of private-sector managers speaks for itself.
Guided by the neo-managerialist ideology, supporters of both liberation and market-driven management sought to radically transform the public manager's role (Barzelay, 1992; Roberts & King, 1996; Schnieder, Teske, & Mintrom, 1995) . Public managers are strongly encouraged to reinvent themselves, relying primarily on private-sector management theory rather than theories of democratic governance (deLeon & Denhardt, 2000) . They are instructed to become innovators and risk takers (Borins, 2000) to radically alter institutional structures, practices, and norms. In other words, public managers are expected to assume the role of entrepreneur.
In the United States, the public entrepreneurship model is by far the most widely recognized model of administrative leadership. Just why Americans are infatuated with public entrepreneurship is a question to ponder. Despite its popularity, public entrepreneurship has been subjected to intense criticism. Its critics charge that public entrepreneurship conflicts with democratic theory (deLeon & Denhardt, 2000; Diver, 1982; Gawthrop, 1999; Goodsell, 1993; R. Moe, 1994; Stever, 1988; Terry, 1993 Terry, , 1998a . Champions of public entrepreneurship have not let such criticism go unanswered: They contend that public entrepreneurship poses no threat to democracy if it is "civic regarding" (Bellone & Goerl, 1993) . Moreover, proponents assert that little empirical evidence has been presented to substantiate the claim that public entrepreneurship poses a threat to democracy (Borins, 2000) .
The spirited debate concerning NPM and public entrepreneurship has focused primarily on the extent to which neo-managerialist philosophy and practices undermine or strengthen values that are highly prized in the U.S. constitutional democracy. Whereas effectiveness, efficiency, and economy are given adequate attention, the protection of values such as accountability, fairness, justice, and representation are central to the debate. What is missing from the debate, however, is a discussion of the long-term effects of NPM philosophy and practices on the integrity of administrative agencies. This is an important question within the context of NPM and reform efforts to reinvent government. Public entrepreneurs, especially those who embrace the neo-managerialist ideology and with it the principles and practices of liberation and market-driven management, are contemptuous of established institutional structures, practices, and norms. Armed with a multitude of reform strategies such as privatization, contracting out, user chargers, vouchers, decentralization, and downsizing (to name a few), the new public manager is expected to radically transform administrative institutions of government.
Although the verdict is still out, evidence is accumulating that NPM philosophy and practices may have produced unintended consequences. In addition to contributing to an increasingly hollow state with a unique set of administrative and institutional challenges, NPM philosophy and practices have weakened the capacity of many public agencies. Both liberation management and market-driven management have contributed to a phenomenon I describe as the thinning of administrative institutions. I now explain this concept in more detail, drawing on the institutional theories of Philip Selznick (1957 Selznick ( , 1992 and Richard Scott (1995) .
THE THINNING OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Philip Selznick's (1957) Leadership in Administration:
A Sociological Interpretation is widely regarded as a classic work in the area of institutional theory. Selznick's exposé on institutional leadership addresses a variety of topics ranging from the importance of defining and redefining an institution's mission to the defense of institutional integrity. The latter is of special interest here. Selznick (1952) introduced the concept of institutional integrity in a study of communist organization. It was not until the publication of Leadership in Administration, however, that the concept attracted serious attention. In describing what he means by the "institutional embodiment of purpose" (p. 90), Selznick explains the meaning and importance of institutional integrity. He suggests that it is the responsibility of the leader as statesman to protect the "institution's distinctive values, competence and role" (p. 119). This is what he means by the defense of institutional integrity. Selznick contends that an institution's integrity is vulnerable to corruption when its values are "tenuous or insecure" (p. 120).
More than 30 years later, in the Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and Promise of Community, Selznick (1992) offers a more complex and developed notion of institutional integrity. Although the essence of the concept remains the same, Selznick examines integrity from the perspective of the moral institution. After discussing the concept of identity and character and their relation to institutional integrity, Selznick explains the idea of integrity this way:
A test of moral character is the idea of integrity. This idea brings morality to bear in a way that respects autonomy and plurality of persons and institutions. The chief virtue of integrity is fidelity to self-defining principles. To strive for integrity is to ask: What is our direction? What are our unifying principles? And how do these square with the claims of morality? . . . . Integrity involves wholeness and soundness . . . . Integrity has to do with principles, and therefore with principled conduct . . . . What counts as integrity, and what affects integrity, will be different for a university press or a commercial publisher; for a constitutional court and a lower court; for a regulatory agency and a highway department. Each type of institution has special functions and values; each has distinctive set of unifying principles. (pp. 322-324) Selznick's (1992) notion of institutional integrity is central to the idea of thin institutions. Let me use the analogy of ice on a frozen lake to clarify this point. When the ice on a frozen lake is several inches thick, it can support the weight of ice skaters and those who wish to engage in the sport of ice fishing. The thicker the ice, the more integrity or strength it has. In this case, one can speak of the ice on the lake as safe and sound. If the ice were thin, however, we would have a totally different scenario. The thinner the ice, the more problematic it becomes in terms of safely supporting the weight of recreational skaters and fishermen. The thinner the ice, the more it lacks integrity. Consequently, we can say that thin ice on the lake has a high probability of collapsing if subjected to too much weight. Obviously, the exact point at which the thinly layered ice is likely to collapse is contingent on the density of the ice and the amount of weight applied to it. The analogy of ice on a frozen lake can be applied to administrative institutions as well. Richard Scott's (1995) institutional framework, when combined with a modified version of Selznick's (1957 Selznick's ( , 1992 idea of institutional integrity, is helpful here.
In a comprehensive overview of the institutionalist approach to organization theory, Scott (1995) provides an analytical framework that identifies three essential elements or pillars of an institution (p. 47). These pillars are described as regulative, normative, and cognitive systems. An institution's regulative system is designed to constrain and standardize behavior. According to Scott, the regulative system is primarily concerned with "rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities" (p. 52). In the tradition of Chester Barnard (1938) , Scott (1995) states that "regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect others' conformity to them, and as necessary, manipulate sanctions-rewards or punishments-in an attempt to influence future behavior" (p. 52).
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The institution's normative system consists of norms and values that determine what is desirable and define how organizational members are to go about achieving preferred goals and objectives. Scott (1995) suggests that the normative system places an emphasis on "normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life" (p. 54). The normative system performs the important function of stabilizing norms and values that are internalized and considered compulsory by others. As noted by Scott, "shared norms and values" are "regarded as the basis of a stable social order" (p. 56).
The third pillar, cognitive systems, concentrates on constitutive rules embedded in cultural systems. Constitutive rules assist organizational members in interpreting and making sense out of their world, especially as it relates to determining "what kinds of action can be taken by what kind of actors" (Scott & Christensen, 1995, p. xviii) . The cognitive system sensitizes organizational members to the "socially mediated construction of a common framework of meaning" (Scott, 1995, p. 58) . Scott (1995; Scott & Christensen, 1995) uses the concepts of regulative, normative, and cognitive systems as the foundation for building a definition of institutions. With the proceeding discussion as a backdrop, he offers the following definition:
Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers-culture, structures, and routines-and they operate at different levels of jurisdiction. (Scott & Christensen, 1995, p. xiii) When combined with a somewhat modified version of Selznick's (1952 Selznick's ( , 1957 Selznick's ( , 1992 idea of institutional integrity, Scott's (1995; Scott & Christensen, 1995) institutional framework provides a valuable analytical device for examining and assessing the capacity of administrative institutions. With this in mind, we can say that institutional integrity refers to the overall strength and soundness of an institution's regulative, normative, and cognitive systems that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. A thin institution lacks integrity because of the erosion and, in turn, weakening of its regulative, normative, and cognitive systems. I use this conceptualization of thin institution in discussing the effect of NPM philosophy and practices on the capacity of administrative agencies.
NPM REFORMS AND THE THINNING OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
In summarizing our earlier discussion, it was noted that liberation management and market-driven management are the standard bearers of the NPM. As may be recalled, advocates of liberation management argue that public managers must be liberated from a bureaucratic system plagued by cumbersome rules, regulations, and red tape. Proponents of market-driven management labor under the assumption that increased competition and strict adherence to private-sector management practices are key ingredients to making public managers manage, thereby improving the performance of administrative agencies. Although both liberation management and market-driven management have produced some positive results, each has also contributed to the thinning of administrative institutions. Many public agencies now lack the required integrity to fulfill their mandated responsibilities.
THE THINNING OF REGULATIVE SYSTEMS
In their zeal to eliminate rules, regulations, and so-called red tape, advocates of liberation management failed to recognize the important role that rules and regulations play in strengthening the capacity and integrity of administrative institutions. As noted by Scott (1995) and other prominent organization theorists (Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Olson, 1989; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) , rules are a stabilizing force; they structure conduct in organizations. William Ocasio (1999) makes this clear when he states:
Rules are embodied in the policies, programs, procedures, routines, and conventions around which organizational activities are constructed. They comprise the knowledge, capabilities, beliefs, values, and memory of the organization and its members and are invoked in response to internal and external stimuli. Rules are . . . tools that both empower and control the social construction of organizational practices. They are . . . a guide for organizational adaptation and change. (p. 386) The indiscriminate attacks on rules and red tape are misguided (see Goodsell, 2000) . Herbert Kaufman's (1977) oft-quoted maxim that "one person's red tape is another's treasured procedural safeguard" (p. 4) certainly deserves serious consideration. As one observes the rhetoric and action of those who march under the banner of liberation management, it becomes readily apparent that rules and regulations are to be avoided, much like the SARS virus (see Aucoin, 1995) . This line of thinking has contributed to thin regulative systems. Thin regulative systems undermine the integrity of administrative institutions and weaken their capacity to serve the common good. A concrete case involving the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) misuse of purchase cards drives this point home.
The General Services Administration (GSA) is delegated authority and responsibility for administering the federal government's credit card program. The GSA frequently enters into contractual agreements with commercial banks to secure credit cards for federal employees to use for official business. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), this method of payment is "intended to streamline procurement and payment procedures and reduce administrative burdens by reducing the number of procurement requests, purchase orders, and vendor payments issues" (United States GAO, 2003, p. 5) . The GAO stated that the "benefits of using purchase cards are lower costs and less red tape [italics added] for both the government and the vendor community" (p. 1).
The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996 exempted the FAA from the Federal Acquisition Regulations and other related laws. Congress gave the FAA the autonomy and authority to develop and implement its own procurement system. The agency adopted a decentralized acquisition system, allowing regional offices to develop their own purchase-card programs and methods for monitoring and controlling the use of such cards. In the spirit of liberation management, the FAA's specialized purchase-card program was designed to liberate acquisition managers from the red tape of the procurement process.
In September 2001, the Department of Transportation's Office of the Inspector General released a report critical of FAA's purchase-card program. This report prompted Congressman Don Young, chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, to ask the GAO to review the FAA's purchasing controls and activities. What the GAO found was disturbing. The GAO reported numerous weaknesses in the FAA's purchase-card controls and stated that such weakness "resulted in instances of improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases, as well as missing assets." GAO identified $5.4 million in improper purchases.
The FAA's brief journey into the world of liberation management is a textbook case of bad administration. The FAA's misuse of taxpayers' dollars does little to increase the American public's confidence in government.
THE THINNING OF NORMATIVE SYSTEMS
As mentioned, the institution's normative system performs an important function by determining and reinforcing desired values and norms. NPM practices, especially those associated with market-driven management, are thinning the normative systems of administrative institutions. This is readily apparent when one considers the increased use of downsizing as a strategy for lowering costs and increasing productivity.
Downsizing entails the divestiture of human assets (Fisher & White, 2000) . At the federal government level, many agencies adopted downsizing as management strategy in response to the so-called reinventing government movement promoted by the Clinton administration. The United States GAO (2000) reported that the nonpostal civilian workforce is smaller than it was more than a decade ago. The federal workforce was reduced from approximately 2.3 million employees in fiscal 1990 to fewer than 1.9 million in 1999 (p. 7). This reduction was aggravated by the fact that a number of federal agencies drastically reduced or froze their hiring efforts for extended periods of time. While reducing the size of the workforce, these measures also "reduced the influx of new people with new skills, new knowledge, new energy and ideas" (United States GAO, 2001, p. 22) . The manner in which the downsizing was implemented has resulted in serious short-term and long-term consequences. In an earlier report addressing the adverse consequences of poorly planned and executed downsizing, the United States GAO (2000) offers the following assessment:
A lack of adequate strategic and workforce planning during the initial rounds of downsizing by some agencies may have affected their ability to achieve organizational mission. Some agencies reported that downsizing in general led to such negative effects as loss of institutional memory [italics added] and an increase in work backlogs. (p. 7)
These comments are insightful as they reveal the thinning of many agencies' normative systems. The loss of institutional memory seriously weakens an agency's capacity. The departure of institutional eldersthose individuals who possess extensive knowledge, expertise, and valuable information about an organization's history-because of agency downsizing jeopardizes the security of institutional values and norms.
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With the massive exodus of institutional elders, agencies lose the ability to transmit and protect values and norms (Selznick, 1957) . This weakens their integrity.
THE THINNING OF COGNITIVE SYSTEMS
In the previous discussion regarding cognitive systems, I noted that this particular institutional element assisted organizational members in interpreting and making sense of their world. Both liberation and marketdriven management have altered constitutive rules, thereby complicating the sense-making process for managers in many agencies. With the elimination of important rules and regulations and the loss of institutional memory, public managers are experiencing difficulty in interpreting and adapting to wider belief systems and cultural frames imposed on the agency. This has serious consequences for agencies in terms of their capacity to respond to external pressures requiring that they become isomorphic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) .
CONCLUSION
I opened this article with a quote from Dwight Waldo's (1984) The Administrative State warning us about the potential problems of blindly accepting the philosophy and practices of American business. As has often been the case, Waldo was right on target. The ideas embodied in both liberation management and market-driven management, if swallowed whole, may not serve democracy well. We in the public administration community must take Waldo's comments to heart. There is a great deal at stake, namely the stability of U.S. constitutional democracy.
I have argued that the thinning of administration institutions is an issue that deserves our undivided attention. We must take corrective action to reverse this trend because thin institutions are weak institutions; weak institutions lack the capacity for good administration. And as I noted on several occasions, good administration is a necessary requirement for restoring the American people's trust and confidence in government. The analytical framework presented here is a modest attempt to shed some light on a vexing problem that threatens the very core of our precious constitutional democracy.
NOTES
1. As Milward, Provan, and Else (1993, p. 310) note, scholars have used terms such as the shadow state, government by proxy, third-party government, and the contracting regimes to describe the hollow state phenomena.
2. This discussion of neomanagerialism and the new public management is based on Terry (1998a) .
3. The term liberation management was popularized by Thomas Peter (1992) , but it did not gain intellectual currency until Paul Light (1997) used it to describe one of his four "tides of reform." 4. Scott (1995) suggests that an institution's regulative system primary mechanism for control is coercion (p. 53). Although he relies on DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) typology, the intellectual roots of using coercion as a control mechanism can be traced back to Chester Barnard's (1938) discussion of methods of persuasion (pp. 142-148).
5. The term institutional elder was coined by Linda M. Terry. I would like to thank her for sharing this concept with me.
